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THE BOUNDARIES OF THE MORAL
(AND LEGAL) COMMUNITY
Brian Leiter*
THE EXPANDING MORAL COMMUNITY
Let me invite you to step back from the parochial political disputes that
dominate public life in America and most other modem democracies, as
well as from the internecine academic quarrels characteristic of so much
professionalized scholarship in the modem academy, and reflect, instead,
on the broader sweep of moral and political thought, in both the
philosophical and practical realm, over the past two or three hundred years.
What must immediately strike any observer of this period is the remarkable
expansion it has witnessed of what I will henceforth call "the moral
community," that is, the community of creatures that are thought entitled to
equal moral consideration, whatever the precise details of what such
consideration involves-that is, whether it is a matter of showing "respect,"
recognizing the "dignity" of each, or "maximizing the utility or well-being"
of each, or some other formulation.' I am speaking here about our official
ideologies and discourse, not necessarily all our actual practices and laws,
though they gradually follow suit over the course of a century or so. But at
the level of ideology, reflected in both ordinary moral opinion and in the
work of philosophers, we in the West-ignorance of the relevant
philosophical and legal traditions requires me to remain agnostic on the
proverbial "East," though the trends seem to be similar-have largely
abandoned the ideas that gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, and now
even sexual orientation are morally relevant attributes in the sense that they
are attributes that determine the basic moral consideration to which one is
entitled. To be sure, in particularcontexts, these characteristics may matter
*
Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy &
Human Values at the University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jaime Edwards, Anup Malani, Richard
Posner and, especially, Matt Evans for helpful comments on an early draft of this lecture. I was helped
by comments on a later draft from Roger Clarke, Anuj Desai, Guy Elgat, Harold Langsam, and Joshua
Sheptow; by questions and comments at a work-in-progress luncheon at the University of Chicago Law
School; and by questions and comments from members of the audience at the Meador Lecture at the
University of Alabama on September 30, 2011.
1.
To be sure, it is equally notable the extent to which the community of creatures entitled to
some-if not necessarily equal-moral consideration has also expanded. But the press on many fronts
has been towards equality of moral consideration, a fact particularly important in the case of non-human
animals, to which we will return.
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because of the context. So, for example, I take it most would still think it
morally unproblematic to consider race in casting the lead role in
Shakespeare's Othello, and most of us would still think it morally
unproblematic that a man contemplating marriage gives some consideration
to the gender or religion of his potential mate.
Where the remarkable modern consensus emerges is with respect to
what I will refer to henceforth as basic moral consideration. To say that
everyone is now thought equal in terms of their entitlement to basic moral
considerationmeans that no one can be treated differently based on their
gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, and, increasingly, sexual orientation
unless there is a further reason beyond simply the fact of having those
characteristics for doing so, and that additional reason itself does not offend
against our sense of what is morally right and wrong. In the case of casting
Othello, for example, there is an artistic reason, related to the conditions
for a successful staging of the play given its setting and the description of
its characters, for taking race into account. And in the case of choosing a
mate, there are reasons related to the value of individual autonomy in
private affairs for thinking it appropriate that in intimate relationships
persons may weigh gender, religion, and race. But it will no longer suffice
to say that the reasons for treating Jews differently than Christians is that
they are Jews, or that the reason for treating Blacks differently than Whites
is that they are Blacks. Being a human being is now enough to triggerbasic
moral consideration. That sentiment is, of course, enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted after World War 11.2 It is
one of the cruel ironies of history that we quite clearly have Hitler and his
atrocities to thank for producing this most recent, stunning shift in moral
consciousness-that is, the one reflected in the Universal Declarationeven though it is one that he himself certainly did not intend.
With regard to this equality of basic moral consideration among human
beings, it bears emphasizing that almost all the major moral and political
theorists of modernity converge, though they have very different reasons
for doing so and very different ideas about what basic moral consideration
requires. But with respect to the entitlement to basic moral consideration,
Bentham and Kant, Marx and Hayek, Rawls and Nozick all agree. 3
Bentham's slogan, recall, was that each counts for one, and not more than

2.
See generally Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995-1996).
3.
To be sure, philosophers like Kant often endorsed the parochial prejudices of their day,
especially about non-whites, but that was almost always due to their endorsement of false factual claims
about racial differences. I should add that my list ofjuxtaposed philosophers in the text is only meant to
be representative of thinkers from different ends of the ideological spectrum, and not to imply that they
are philosophical peers: Hayek is obviously not a thinker on a par with Marx, nor Nozick on a par with
Rawls.
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one, in the utilitarian calculus.4 Kant's formalization of the Golden Rule
eschewed consequential calculations, but still issued in the same edict
about moral consideration: no one was to be treated merely as a means, but
rather as an end, a standard even more demanding than Bentham's, but one
that accepts the entitlement to basic moral consideration-at least among
rational persons, a caveat to which we will need to return. Marx's famous
formulation-"from each according to his ability, to each according to his
needs"-made no reference to race or gender, just to human abilities and
needs.5 What Hayek calls the moral ideal of "individualism" involves "the
respect for the individual man qua man, that is, the recognition of his own
views and tastes as supreme in his own sphere, . . . and the belief that it is

desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and bents."6
Nothing in Hayek's argument suggests that the reference to "man" should
be taken semantically rather than syntactically.
In this pantheon of well-known moral and political theorists of
modernity, the case of Bentham is particularly instructive, because the
increasing moral importance assigned to the experience of pain and
suffering (which was his great innovation in Western moral thinking) is
also one of the stunning changes in the moral sensibility of modernity. One
need only recall the Homeric epics to realize that there were eras of
humanity in which pain was not deemed an overriding practical
consideration compared to, say, honor or glory. And as Nietzsche
emphasizes, there are large swaths of human history in which the cruel
infliction of pain on others was an occasion for festivities and celebration.
But Benthamite hedonism-though it has few explicit adherents these
days-has in one very important respect now carried the day in ordinary
and even philosophical thought, so that even non-utilitarians and nonBenthamites avert to, indeed take for granted, the moral salience of
suffering. The "intuitive" moral salience of suffering is certainly central to
the rise of vegetarianism on so-called "moral" grounds in the affluent
capitalist societies over the last generation. We shall return to that
astonishing phenomenon and the efforts to add "species" to the list of
morally irrelevant attributes later in this lecture.
I should emphasize again that my thesis about the expansion of the
moral community-the community in which equal basic moral

4.
See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in 10 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION AND SOCIETY 203, 257 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969).
5.
KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 10 (Int'l Publishers Co. 1938) (1891).
FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 68 (Bruce Caldwell, ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 2007)
6.

(1944).
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 40-45 (Maudemarie Clark & Alan
7.
J. Swensen, trans., 1998); cf MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON

(Alan Sheridan, trans., 1977).
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consideration is due-does not involve denying that there remains
pernicious hostility based on gender, race, ethnicity, and class. The striking
fact, however, is that such hostility must now generally travel in disguise,
since only Klansman and Nazis and misogynistic sociopaths talk openly
any longer about moral status depending on one's race or religion or
gender. Opponents of gay marriage are now under enormous moral
pressure for precisely this reason. Once marriage among elites, especially
over the course of the nineteenth century, ceased to be arranged for social
and economic advantage, and became instead a relationship based on such
mercurial considerations as "love" and "compatibility," then the
explanation for why two men, or two women, or one woman and three
men, should not be "married" ceased to make any sense. More than a
century later, this development now draws its obvious consequence. More
generally, laws have gradually come to reflect these changes in the
conception of the moral community, from the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (already mentioned) to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to the
Americans with Disabilities Act, to the constitutions of all the Western
countries that emerged from the horrors of WWII.
This kind of emerging moral consensus poses a stark challenge to a
meta-ethical view that was dominant for much of the twentieth century, and
one that I will be defending in this lecture: what is called, in contemporary
philosophical terminology, "moral anti-realism." Moral anti-realists deny
that there are any objective facts about what is morally right and wrong,
that judgments about such facts are either mistaken in toto or really devices
for doing something else, for example, expressing feelings and noncognitive attitudes, perhaps as a way of cajoling our compatriots to feel
similarly.8 Our world, says the moral anti-realist, contains many different
things: rivers and mountains, chairs and tables, oxygen and quarks, human
minds and human bodies, gold and other metals. But one thing it does not
contain is any objective fact about what is morally right and wrong. Just as
the scientific revolution and its legacy purged the world of gods and ghosts,
of the ether and of phlogiston, so too it has rendered explanatorily otiose
the idea that the world contains any objective moral facts that explain our
moral attitudes.9 To be sure, events in the world induce powerful, emotive,
and affective responses in humans, and at least some of those responses are
then reified as "moral truths," rather than being recognized as the
psychological and anthropological artifacts they are-artifacts that are of
theoretical interest to observers, to be sure, as well as of practical

8.

BRIAN LEITER, NIETZSCHE ON MORALITY 137, 148 (2002).

9.

See Brian Leiter, Moral Facts and Best Explanations, 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 79 (2001),

reprintedin BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 203 (2007).
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importance to "insiders," but which do not pick out any independently
existing features of our world.
But how, then, is such moral anti-realism to be squared with the
apparently remarkable consensus about the contours of our expanding
moral community? Why not think this convergence in moral (and
gradually, legal) opinion over the past two centuries is really just
convergence on an objective fact, just like the massive scientific
convergence on the laws of Newtonian mechanics regarding observable
physical objects, or on the evolution of species by the mechanism of natural
selection? That is the central philosophical question about the expanding
boundaries of the moral and legal community that will be my focus here.
EXPLAINING THE EXPANDING MORAL COMMUNITY: THE WHIG HISTORIES

One attractive-and decidedly anti- anti-realist-way to explain this
quite extraordinary development in human consciousness-namely, our
expanding conception of who counts morally-is by appeal to what I will
call "Whig Histories," according to which these changes really are just a
story of expanding moral knowledge. Just as we discovered that the
movement of mid-size physical objects is governed by the laws of
Newtonian mechanics, and that those same laws do not describe the
behavior of quantum particles, so too we have discovered that chattel
slavery is a grave moral wrong and that women have as much moral claim
on the electoral vote as men.
But we have not "discovered" all these claims in quite the same way,
and that requires some notice. The justification of (most) scientific
propositions turns on their predictive, empirical success and when they are,
in fact, deemed successful they are thought to have illuminated some aspect
of the causal structure of the world.10 But the justification of moral beliefs
turns neither on their empirical predictive success, nor their illuminating
the causal structure of the world." One justifies, for example, the belief
that eating meat is morally wrong by appeal to a principle thought to be
intuitively (not empirically!) plausible like, "unnecessary suffering is
morally wrong," conjoined with empirical beliefs like, "animals are
sentient creatures capable of suffering" and "the way animals are raised and
killed in preparing meat causes them unnecessary suffering." This kind of
argument licenses no empirical predictions and illuminates nought about
10.
On the centrality of causation to understanding what it is scientific theories do in explaining
phenomena, see Nancy Cartwright, From Causation to Explanation and Back, in THE FUTURE FOR
PHILOSOPHY 230 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004).
11.
Even moral realists who think moral facts are part of the best causal explanation of experience
do not believe that this fact is part of the justification of their being morally true. See, e.g., Peter
Railton, Moral Realism, 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986).
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the causal structure of the world. By contrast, we now accept that a
scientific proposition like e=mc 2 is true not for the kinds of reasons offered
against the morality of eating meat, but because the mass-energy
equivalence Einstein proposed was experimentally confirmed (the first time
was in 1932 by J.D. Cockcroft and E.T. Walton).
It would be too quick, however, to draw a line between empirical and
moral propositions so cleanly. The striking fact about the history of
inegalitarian thought is that it has regularly traded on empirical claims that
are amenable to investigation in accord with the canons of epistemic
warrant (i.e., the standards of evidence and justification) we deploy in the
sciences. Aristotle is only the most notorious case-he thought, for
example, that women and slaves were cognitively incapable of managing
their lives, so were actually better off ceding control to free men so
capablel-but Aristotelian reasoning was also invoked to justify the
treatment of African slaves in the modem era, who were variously deemed
to "suppl[y] the missing link between human beings and chimpanzees',' 3
and, according to some scientists "were a separate species," with more in
common with monkeys than Europeans. 14 As the historian Annette GordonReed notes, in discussing the profound impact of Harriet Beecher Stowe's
1852 novel Uncle Tom's Cabin, "[H]er story was effective because it
directly assaulted Southern pretensions. Pro-slavery Southerners had been
propagating a narrative of their own: slavery was a benevolent institution in
which mentally inferior slaves were watched over by owners who treated
them as part of their family."15 Stowe's novel exploded that ludicrous
narrative. The Nazi characterization of the Jews was similar to the
characterizations of Africans by slavery apologists. Heinrich Himmler
produced an entire magazine, in 1942, about "The Subhuman," warning
Germans against being deceived by appearances, by-as he put it- "beasts
in human form."' 6 Jews were his prime examples, of course, but failures to
pinpoint the "blood" differences between Jews and "real" humans led
Hitler to recruit "literary and legal scholars, linguists, historians,
12.
Aristotle's view exerted influence well beyond his own time. As David Livingstone Smith
writes in his gripping book, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE
OTHERS (2011), even in the sixteenth century, Spanish scholars were arguing "that there is almost as
great a difference between Indians [in the New World] and Spaniards as between monkeys and men,"
and that "although the natives are not 'monkeys and bears,' their mental abilities are like those of 'bees
and spiders."' Id. at 77-78. "Why bees and spiders?" As Professor Smith notes, Aristotle thought some
animals were capable of "purposive behavior" that still was irrational, since it did not involve practical
reason and thought. "Aristotle believed that only humans can think. So, in comparing the behavior of
Indians to that of spiders and ants, [one] implicitly denied that they are rational-and therefore
human-beings." Id. at 78.
13.
Id. at ll4.
14.
Id. at ll9.
15.
Annette Gordon-Reed, The Persuader,THE NEW YORKER, June 13, 2011, at 120, 123.
16.
See SMITH, supra note 12, at 155.
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geographers, and anthropologists" to make the case for the "subhuman"
character of Jews.17 Though biology did not deliver the alleged "factual"
component for Nazi racism, the social sciences complied.
Moral anti-realists like me of course recognize that moral attitudes tend
to be responsive to non-moral facts-even the most subjective evaluative
attitudes are so responsive, after all. The judgment, "We shouldn't eat at La
Bistro Francais Pretense," will typically give way before a satisfying
gustatory experience there. More importantly, the evaluative judgment,
"Don't eat the pork dishes at Szechuan West, they're made from cat," is
quite plainly defeated by the revelation that this is a slander on the
restaurant's proprietor. Changes in our understanding of the facts have
surely played some role in changes in our moral attitudes, yet this just
pushes the explanatory question back one step: namely, why were people
so slow to correctly cognize the non-moral facts, why were they so ready to
accept factual claims that could not, in fact, withstand scrutiny in light of
the canons of epistemic warrant otherwise operative in contemporaneous
scientific investigations? Canons of epistemic warrant and justification are,
after all, themselves norms or values, and yet they were rendered inert in
certain domains by countervailing inegalitarian moral attitudes. Some other
evaluative attitude-disgust with, contempt for, antipathy towards, e.g.,
Africans or Jews-was itself an obstacle to responsible investigation of the
non-moral facts. That phenomenon should hardly be surprising in light of
recent work in social psychology. In an influential paper ten years ago that
synthesized a wide body of empirical research,' 8 Jonathan Haidt argued
that moral judgments in most ordinary contexts arise from powerful
emotional responses, not rational reflection, and that while reasons and
evidence are often supplied post-hoc, commitment to the evaluative
judgment typically survived the failure of the reasons and evidence to
support them! Haidt suggested that "the mere fact that friends, allies, and
acquaintances have made a moral judgment" was more important to
understanding someone's commitment to it than the actual rational support
for the judgment.' 9 That suggests the best explanation for the prevalence of
a moral judgment will be psycho-social in character-whatever it is that
explains the community convergence-rather than something epistemic or
cognitive.

Id. at 161.
17.
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to
18.
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
Id. at 819. A moral intuitionist, who thought correct moral judgment was just a matter of
19.
"intuiting" the moral properties of a situation, might think that the judgments of "friends, allies, and
acquaintances" constitute testimony that does justify making the same judgment. I assume throughout
that moral intuitionism is false, for the kinds of reasons P.F. Strawson adduced a half-century ago in
EthicalIntuitionism, 24 PHIL. 23 (1949).
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In light of these findings, then, we may still wonder: why did the racist
evaluative attitudes yield at the time they did, such that reliable empirical
knowledge about racial or ethnic differences could come to light and the
moral community begin to expand accordingly? If, on the Whig history,
"moral knowledge" flowed from a correct appreciation of non-moral
factual knowledge, we still need to know why such non-moral factual
knowledge became possible when it did, that is, why it became possible to
overcome the inegalitarian evaluative attitudes of "friends, allies, and
acquaintances" and discover the facts about different races, different ethnic
groups and so on when we did? "Factual knowledge" is, to repeat, a valueladen notion, one dependent on the acceptance of certain epistemic values
that license judgments about what the facts are. Yet one striking feature of
the changing conceptions of the moral community is that there was
widespread agreement on the relevant epistemic values long before there
was widespread agreement, for example, on the fact that AfricanAmericans were not, in fact, cognitively or biologically different from
European-Americans, and were equally capable of governing their affairs
autonomously. The key challenge for the Whig Histories is to explain the
delay in recognizing the "facts" that shared epistemic values should have
revealed. If the expanding moral community was really just a case of
expanding knowledge, then why was such knowledge retarded by
inegalitarian moral attitudes?20
Someone might object: surely the fact that the Catholic Church once
rejected Galileo's heliocentrism on religious grounds does not show that it
is not an objective fact that the sun is the center of our solar system? And,
indeed, even a moral anti-realist like me must agree it does not. But
remember that in the dispute between Galileo and the Church the dispute
was between different epistemic criteria, with Galileo appealing to
systematic observational evidence and the Church appealing to scripture.
The puzzle about the persistence of inegalitarian moral attitudes is that
many, perhaps most, of those who embraced them accepted the exact same
standardsof evidence as their opponents. What is the Whig Historian to say
about this?
We must, of course, be sensitive to the possibility that in some cases
the inegalitarian attitudes were just, as it were, brute, i.e., they did not
depend upon non-moral factual claims that might themselves be amenable

20.
To put the point differently: if you think that increasing knowledge about moral facts is like
increasing knowledge of physical facts, then you have to explain why epistemic values wholly adequate
to knowledge of certain physical (or psycho-physical) facts are not wholly adequate to knowledge of the
moral facts that depend on those physical facts. That is, convergence on epistemic values (those that
license conclusions about what we know in the physical or psycho-physical realm) has turned out to be
insufficient to guarantee convergence on moral values. So something else must explain that, something
non-epistemic.
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to empirical refutation in the ordinary course of scientific investigation.
One can accept, as most philosophers do, the supervenience of evaluative
facts on descriptive ones (in other words: no difference in the value of X is
possible without some difference in the underlying descriptive facts about
X), and still think it possible that many evaluative judgments are brute, i.e.,
they depend on no claims beyond the judgment that certain descriptive
characteristics obtain. Think of the evaluative judgment, "I will not eat the
tofu pizza, it is awful." This judgment is brute in the sense that we demand
no more from the judger than that he be correct that it is tofu pizza he is
asked to eat and that he sincerely reports his response to that. He needn't
supply any additional justifications to explain the judgment, that is, he need
not make any further descriptive claims about tofu pizza: his evaluative
response is just brute. We must, alas, countenance the possibility that some
inegalitarian evaluative attitudes are like that too, that is, that they are
brute.
Among contemporary philosophers, Jeremy Waldron is unique in
giving explicit attention to something like the last phenomenon: namely,
someone who, in "brute" fashion, tries to deny what Waldron calls "basic
equality." 21 How can we respond to such an inegalitarian, someone who
simply denies that Jews or Blacks or women are -of equal moral worth,
deserving of equal basic moral consideration? The conclusion of Waldron's
argument should give the Whig historian of moral knowledge pause.
Waldron correctly notes that contemporary bourgeois philosophers 22 in the
capitalist societies (like Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Bernard
Williams) take for granted that all human beings are entitled to equal moral
consideration, 23 but that they offer no account of why this is so.24 Waldron
turns to John Locke, who does have an account of why human beings are
all entitled to equal moral consideration, however that moral consideration
is construed. But on Waldron's reading-a very plausible reading of Locke,
I want to emphasize-the defense of "basic equality" is "an axiom of
theology, understood as perhaps the most important truth about God's way
with the world in regard to the social and political implications of His
creation of the human person." 2 5 Or as Waldron puts it later: "Lockean
[basic] equality ... is a conception of equality that makes no sense except

JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN
21.
LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002).

22.
1 use the term "bourgeois" in the traditional Marxian sense, to connote both the class position
of these philosophers, and the scope and character of their moral concern and moral advocacy. It is not
meant to prejudge the merits of their views.
23.
They are not, I hasten to add, all moral realists-indeed, Williams is explicitly an anti-realist.
24.
WALDRON, supra note 21, at 2-4.
Id. at 6. The key argument for this reading comes in Chapter 3.
25.
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in the light of a particular account of the relation between man and God." 2 6
But if the only explanation in the offing as to why human beings are
entitled to equal moral consideration depends on religious premises,
including a belief in a certain kind of God, then defenders of moral equality
in the twenty-first century should, perhaps, be worried, at least if they think
their egalitarianism requires a true or at least rational foundation.
So where does that leave the Whig Histories of the expanding moral
community? They can appeal to discoveries about the facts that underlie
the egalitarian evaluative judgments, but they can not explain that process
in solely epistemic terms, that is, solely in terms of greater sensitivity to
considerations relevant to the truth or warrant of particular claims about
what the world is like.27 That, by itself, does not defeat the Whig Histories,
since we have examples, even in the history of science, of the way in which
non-epistemic interests (that is, interests unrelated to truth or knowledge)
yield epistemically sound results. As Marxists like to point out, the
capitalist class has a strong interest in figuring out the actual causal
structure of the world, since without such knowledge, profit can not be
extracted from nature. 2 8 But in the case of the Marxian explanation of
scientific progress, we can see why non-epistemic considerations would
have yielded epistemically privileged outcomes: if you do not know the
actual causal mechanisms by which oil can be removed from the earth, then
you can not realize your non-epistemic interest in profit from the recovery
and sale of oil. Can we tell such a story in the case of the expanding moral
community? Can we explain why human suffering matters morally,
regardless of what kind of human it is that suffers? More problematically,
the Whig historian, if Waldron is right, can only justify the abandonment of
brute inegalitarian attitudes by relying on theological premises that are now
wholly incredible in light of the canons of epistemic warrant otherwise
operative in scientific investigations.2 In that case, one would expect a
massive rise in inegalitarian attitudes and a contraction of the moral
community in parts of the world, like Europe, increasingly dubious of
theological premises. But what we see, in fact, in most of Europe is just the
opposite.

26.
Id. at 82.
27.
Once again, I assume that moral intuitionism is not a serious position. Admittedly, there has
been a revival of intuitionism in academic philosophy, but this is, it seems to me, more an
embarrassment for the discipline than a serious intellectual development.
28.
See Peter Railton, Marx and the Objectivity of Science, 1984 PHIL. SCL ASS'N 813 (1984),
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 763 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991).

29.
Of course, one might abandon a brute inegalitarian attitude because of a competing brute
egalitarian attitude, but that is wholly compatible with the moral anti-realist account, since there are no
objective facts about the world that command one attitude or the other: it is just the clash of brute
attitudes.
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EXPLAINING THE EXPANDING MORAL COMMUNITY:
THE NON-WHIG HISTORIES

There must, of course, be non-Whig explanations possible for the
phenomenon of the expanding moral community, and it is to those that I
want to turn my attention. These explanations have in common that they do
not need to suppose that our sense of the expanding moral community is a
matter of knowledge or discovery of some objective facts. Let me start with
the most familiar form of non-Whig, or debunking explanation, namely
evolutionary explanations, which are all the rage these days in philosophy
and the social sciences. 30 By evolutionary explanations, I mean
explanations that appeal to evolution by natural selection, as opposed to all
the other evolutionary mechanisms (e.g., genetic hitchhiking or genetic
drift) that affect the evolution of species. Such explanations are of
somewhat limited help to the non-Whig stories about the expanding moral
communities, though they certainly contribute to them. First, the
explanatory stories on offer concern only the evolutionary explanation of
altruism, that is, concern for others, a kind of concern that can, of course,
be far more tepid than considering the "other" to be a full-fledged member
of the moral community, whose suffering, for example, has as much moral
salience as the suffering of anyone else. Second, the only well-confirmed
and generally accepted evolutionary hypothesis in the literature-deriving
from the work of W.D. Hamilton-involves altruistic concern for kin, that
is, for organisms that share some of the genetic make-up of the altruist.
From a selectionist point of view, so the Hamiltonian argument goes,
altruistic concern for kin can be highly effective in passing on genetic
material to the next generation as long as that concern is directed towards
kin, such as sisters or cousins or aunts who have some of the same genetic
material. Thus, natural selection will select for a genetic predisposition to
nurture and sustain kin, since they too can pass the genetic inheritance on.
Yet that is, of course, a very far cry from viewing non-kin, indeed utter
strangers, regardless of race or religion, as entitled to basic moral
consideration. Third, even the more ambitious selectionist arguments for
"group selectionism," associated with Elliott Sober and David Sloan
Wilson, would still fail to explain the elastic boundaries of the moral
community in the contemporary era, since, at best, these arguments tell us
why individuals might develop altruistic concern for members of their
group who are not kin; they do not explain why communities might come
to adopt laws that give equal moral consideration to persons outside the
Evolutionary explanations are not necessarily debunking, and some writers have thought,
30.
quite mistakenly in my view, that an evolutionary account lends support to the objectivity of morality.
For a recent, contrary view, see Sharon Street, A Darwinian Dilemmafor Realist Theories of Value, 127
PHIL. STUD. 109 (2006).
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group. In the end, then, evolutionary explanations inspired by Darwin do
not fully explain the actual phenomenon at issue, namely, the expansion of
the boundaries of the moral community beyond kin and group members
over the past two centuries.
If Darwin can not fully discharge the task, then perhaps we should turn
our attention to those other two giants of nineteenth century thought, Marx
and Nietzsche. Let us call the first family of explanations we will consider
"Marxish," in the hopes of being accorded some textual latitude about
Marx interpretation. On these Marxish accounts, very crudely, our
expanding moral sympathies are explicable in terms of economic
developments. So, for example, even as the nations in the vanguard of
capitalist development, like much of Europe and the United States, ravaged
other parts of the globe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in pursuit
of capitalist profit, it is striking that their moral sensibilities rose to new
heights: genocide, gruesome executions, the suffering of the poor, even the
suffering of non-human animals, gradually became either verboten or
objects of moral concern. Such new moral attitudes served an obvious
ideological function, obscuring the actual practices of the capitalist ruling
classes behind a veneer of high-minded moral concern. Yet one imagines
something more was at work as well. Capitalism, as it expands the
productive capacity of humanity to heretofore unimagined heights,
increasingly ameliorates the base needs of our bodily existence: for food,
for shelter, for protection from physical harm. As the sensitivity of the
capitalist class to pain, even discomfort becomes more refined-a fact
familiar to anyone who spends time in the company of representatives of
the ruling class-it should hardly be surprising that a moral distaste for the
infliction of suffering becomes prevalent. We quite naturally project our
own sensitivities on to those we recognize as similar to us. Of course, the
key notion is "similar to us," and the capacity for the capitalist class to
deceive itself about relevant similarities has been as great as that of most
other ruling classes in history. Yet the gradual rise in living standards that
follows upon most successful cases of capitalist development typically
insures the spread of such sensitivity in the population at large, making it
harder for social orders to remain stable without becoming more responsive
to the increasingly refined needs of the broader population.
Perhaps more important is that in capitalist societies all persons are
evaluated first and foremost along a single dimension-namely, their
economic or productive value. Thus, corporate executives are ranked by
compensation, art works make the news based on the price they command
at auction, and even university professors carefully scrutinize their
compensation relative to their perceived peers. Notice, however, that if
every person's worth is ultimately resolvable into an economic value, then
almost all other possible bases of worth and consideration (for example,
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race or gender) should really be foreclosed as relevant data points. The
logic of value in capitalist societies is quite plainly one in which the moral
community ought to expand to include anyone who can establish his or her
value in the marketplace. This is obviously not to deny that capitalist
societies have been rife with invidious prejudice-the United States is an
obvious example"-or that the logic of the market will yield the ideally
inclusive moral community. It is, however, to claim that capitalism itself
puts pressure on attempts to limit the moral community (as Marx himself
recognized, and as historical experience has repeatedly borne out). 32
Our other family of non-Whig explanations is associated with another
German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, though it finds some obvious
echoes in the work of Freud. Nietzsche is, in one sense, a materialist: he
thinks the moral attitudes of individuals often admit of a physiological
explanation. But he is not a materialist in the Marxist sense of appealing to
the economic circumstances of social life as explanatory factors;
Nietzschean explanations operate at the level of individual psychology, not
socio-economics, though their targets are often large-scale cultural
transformations, such as the triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empire.
Nietzsche thinks that ideas and values, once let loose in the world, have the
potential to take advantage of the pre-existing dispositions of individuals
and wreak world-historic changes. In On the Genealogy of Morality,
Nietzsche suggests that three profound psychological events laid the
foundation for modern moral consciousness.
First, there was the envy and resentment of the oppressed classes in the
late Roman Empire (the "slave revolt in values" as Nietzsche calls it), the
period when Christianity was born, which led to a revaluation of existing
Roman values, such that "the aristocratic value equation (good = noble =
powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)" was inverted into a very
different valuation, according to which "the miserable alone are the good;
the poor, powerless, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick,
ugly are also the only pious, the only blessed in God." 33 Second, there was
In both the United States and South Africa, it was of course white communists who were the
31.
early organizers of opposition to racial segregation. But communism was, of course, also predicated on
an expansive idea of the moral community, of all human beings qua members of a species with certain
distinctive characteristics conducive to their flourishing.
32.
Essentially Marxian explanations-ones that treat technological progress as the primary
driving force-can be cashed out in the language of contemporary economics as well, as my colleague
Anup Malani reminds me. Humans have certain basic needs-food, clothing, shelter, some basic forms
of culture-and technological improvements (that are partly exogenous, though can be influenced
endogenously by factors like intellectual property regimes) enable us to meet those needs in new ways,
e.g., without the need for slaves, for example, or without the need for women to work only in the home.
To the extent such Neoclassical economic explanations can be filled out, they just strengthen the case
for the non-Whig histories.
33.
NIETZSCHE, supra note 7, at 16. Obviously the triumph of Christianity can be explained by
reference to a variety of causes, but Nietzsche is primarily interested in facts about individual
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the primordial fact that creatures like us, once forced into civilization, had
to find new outlets for our instinctive cruelty, and found those outlets in
self-cruelty, namely, the strictures of conscience and guilt. (Freud made this
idea famous in Civilization and Its Discontents.3 4) Third, and finally, there
was the existential need to make sense of suffering, of the fact that
suffering is an inescapable feature of human existence, yet one that can
only be tolerated if it makes sense, if it has a meaning-that is, if it is
understood as punishment for sin, for transgressing moral ideals of selfdenial that no actual individual can live up to for long.35 Out of this
complicated psychological and historical brew of envy, cruelty, and
existential need emerged our modem moral consciousness characterized
most distinctively by its hyper-sensitivity to suffering, as reflected in both
Christianity, and its concern to reconcile its followers to suffering, and, as a
later consequence, Benthamite utilitarianism, with its reduction of all
normative questions to questions of pleasure and pain.3 6 Since on
Nietzsche's rather plausible view, there was no way, given the existential
facts about the human situation, that pleasure could prevail in such a
competition, it seemed to him clear that a utilitarian perspective on life
would yield the conclusion that life was not in fact worth living.
Nietzsche's way of resisting that conclusion was to resist the idea that
suffering was primafacie objectionable from a moral point of view.3 7 It is
worth noting that this was not idle posturing on his part, since he himself
endured extraordinary physical maladies throughout his productive life, yet
never gave up on life or work during his years of hardship. But from a
Nietzschean perspective, the modem conception of the expanding moral
community, which has its roots in the Christian idea of the equality of all
who suffer, is fundamentally an artifact of the historical and psychological
forces that have elevated suffering to its overriding importance in practical
thought.
I suspect that the best explanation for the emerging consensus about
basic moral consideration among Western theorists involves the kinds of
psychology, which better suit his polemical aims. Of course, if one accepts the demand of
methodological individualism in historical explanation, then any candidate explanation had better be
explicable at bottom in terms of the motives individuals would have had for taking certain actions.
34.
SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Joan Riviere trans., 1994).
35.
See generally LEITER, NIETZSCHE ON MORALITY, supra note 8. For a systematic account, see
especially id at 193-288.
36.
Even contemporary moral philosophers who are not hedonists, like Derek Parfit, assign a
central role to the moral significance of suffering. See, e.g., I DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 2011). Ironically, Parfit thinks the kind of systematic moral theory he and his
followers pursue is one that somehow purges ethical thinking of its religious prejudices.
37.
1 do not want to ascribe the view in the text to Tamsin Shaw, but some of her (unpublished)
work helped me in thinking about these issues in Nietzsche this way. (Note that while Benthamite
hedonism entails that suffering is prima facie objectionable, one might reject the former and still
embrace the latter on some other grounds.)
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considerations adduced by non-Whig histories, of which I have given only
a truncated survey. One can not claim, of course, that there is
overwhelming empirical evidence in support of the evolutionary, Marxian
or Nietzschean explanations, though each has plenty of evidence in its
favor, even if not decisive. The holistic character of all justification
requires us, of course, to consider the costs of alternatives, and here I think
it is crucial that the costs to a plausible metaphysics and epistemology that
admits the existence of objective moral facts into our overall picture of
what the world is like are too great, on a par with admitting the objective
reality of gods and spirits. I do not intend the preceding considerations to
be convincing to the arch moral realist (someone committed to the
objectivity of moral truths), but grant me, for the sake of the remainder of
the argument, that the non-Whig histories tell us quite a lot, perhaps all,
about our expanding sense of the moral community.
How FAR WILL (SHOULD?) THE COMMUNITY EXPAND?
If we may be permitted some simplification, we can say that in roughly
the last 250 years in the West, the moral community has expanded from
propertied Christian white men to include women, people of all races, and
people of all religions. We are now, presently, engaged in the concluding
stages of a struggle-symbolized by the battle over gay marriage-between
those who would expand the moral community to include gay men and
lesbians, and those who would resist, though it now seems certain that the
community will expand to include them, even in the United States. No one
is in doubt any longer about either their sentience or their economic value
in capitalist societies; in many respects gay men and lesbians are already
full members of the legal community. Since marriage, in capitalist
societies, is now purely an affair of individual desire, it is almost
inconceivable that legal restrictions on marriage to (professed)
heterosexuals of opposite sexes will survive much longer.
But how far will the expansion of the moral community go? Will it
come to include trees and plant life? Insects? The earth itself? You may
think those cases far-fetched, and perhaps they are, but what has seemed
"far-fetched" in moral matters at one time is often a poor guide to what
comes to seem important at a later date. Right now, one of the central
battles over the contours of the moral and legal community in the advanced
capitalist societies concerns non-human animals, and it is to their status I
Whig and non-Whig histories aren't the only possibilities: it could also just be "luck."
38.
Suppose Hitler had won World War I: it seems very likely that our conception of the moral community
might have been very different than it is, unless we are confident that other historical forces would have
pressed even a Nazified Europe in the same direction. (Thanks to Anup Malani for pressing a version of
this worry.)
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would like to turn. The Western moral community may increasingly
renounce discrimination among religions, genders, class, and race, but it
still takes species differences quite seriously, as the menu of almost any
restaurant immediately reveals.
We may ask two kinds of questions about the moral status of nonhuman animals: a predictive one about whether the moral community will
expand to include them; and a moral question about whether it should. As a
moral anti-realist, I think the latter question has no rational answer, once
we clear up any disagreements about the non-moral facts. We can agree
that non-human animals are sentient, and that they suffer, and still
"reasonably" believe that their suffering is justifiable or defensible, given
our other moral attitudes. That this is so is brought out clearly by the work
of the moral philosopher Peter Singer, our leading contemporary heir of
Bentham and advocate for vegetarianism. He has argued, on the one hand,
that our treatment of non-human animals is morally indefensible, since the
suffering of a sentient creature is what is morally salient,3 9 not the species
of the sufferer. Yet, on the other hand, he has argued that it can be morally
justifiable to kill human infants afflicted with various kinds of cognitive
and physical defects, since to allow them to live would, over the long term,
produce more suffering than happiness.40 If one thought infanticide was
morally abhorrent-as a matter of brute moral attitude-then one might
take Singer's position as a simple reductio of the idea that suffering per se
is the only thing that is morally relevant, since it leads to an absurd and
heinous conclusion. Singer has no actual argument against such a response,
since his entire position rests simply on an equally brute, and unexplained,
attitude, namely, that suffering per se is abhorrent.41 But if the consequence
of believing that suffering per se (regardless of species) is the only thing
that is morally salient leads to the conclusion that it is permissible to kill
human babies with defects, it is equally reasonable to take that to show that
species membership (namely, being human) is morally salient, since it
explains why killing human babies is wrong, even when their cognitive and
physical defects will impose burdens on others.
It should hardly be surprising that it is not rationally obligatory to think
the suffering of non-human animals is on a par with that of humans, given
more general lessons of twentieth-century philosophy, which show that no
belief about any subject-matter is rationally obligatory for all agents
There are nuances of Singer's views I am ignoring here: e.g., he talks in terms of desire39.
satisfaction, rather than pleasure and pain, though this comes to the same thing in the case of nonhuman animals. Singer also thinks sapience can be morally salient, insofar as it affects the experience
of pleasure and pain (or the satisfaction of desires).
See PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 158-76 (3d ed. 2011).
40.
He sometimes derides responses like this as failures to follow through a principled and
41.
rational argument, but such responses are obviously question-begging.
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regardless of their ends. First, from the famous Duhem-Quine thesis 42
about the under-detennination of scientific theories by evidence, we know
that there are not even any scientific hypotheses that are rationally
obligatory, in the sense of required by logic and evidence. This is because
any recalcitrant evidence elicited in a test of a hypothesis is compatible
with the hypothesis as long as we are willing to give up the background
assumptions such a test requires. In choosing among competing hypotheses
and background assumptions, we must always fall back on non-rational
considerations,
such
as
theoretical
simplicity,
methodological
43
conservatism, and consilience. Second, unless there were a plausible
substantive conception of rationality (there does not appear to be one, alas),
then rationality itself is instrumental, imposing normative constraints only
on the means chosen to realize our ends, whatever they may happen to be.
Thus, even norms for belief are hostage to ultimate ends, and so particular
beliefs are "irrational" only relative to the believer's ends.44 Neither Singer
nor anyone else can show that one is rationally required to rule out ends
(like forbidding infanticide) which require as a matter of instrumental
reasoning the repudiation of the moral salience of suffering without regard
to species.
Given our general epistemological predicament-namely, that no belief
is rationally obligatory-it becomes even more interesting to ask the
causal-predictive question, namely, whether it seems likely that the moral
community will expand to include non-human animals? The answer to this
question turns, in significant part, on the question of whatfeatures of living
things will come to seem morally significant. Even Peter Singer has
acknowledged 45 that one of the most influential parts of his 1975 book,
Animal Liberation, was not the Benthamite argument mentioned already,
but rather the emotionally evocative description of factory-farming
practices in Chapter 3 of his book. These descriptions evoked the suffering
of sentient creatures, and so elicited feelings of compassion from readers
quite effectively. But from Singer's perspective, the moral salience of
suffering also entails the moral permissibility of infanticide, and it is easy
enough to see that even a rather discreet description of infanticide factories
or hospices (call them what you want) would immediately elicit a very
different set of moral intuitions and feelings. Clearly our emotional
responses to vivid descriptions offactory-farmed chickens and the painless

42.
Named after French chemist Pierre Duhem and American philosopher W.V.O. Quine.
43.
See, e.g., W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (1970).
44.
See, e.g., Peter Railton, Facts and Values, 14 PHIL. TOPiCS 5 (1986).
45.
See his reply to Judge Richard Posner at Peter Singer, Animal Rights, Entry 5, SLATE (June
13, 2001, 11:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news andjpolitics/dialogues/features/2001/
animal rights/_6.html.
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killing of defective human babies are not going to yield a rational verdict
about the moral propriety of either practice.46
Despite the best efforts of Bentham and Singer, sentience can hardly
claim pride of place in our moral thinking these days. Let me ask you to
recall, for a moment, the old Planet of the Apes movie and its successorsnot the 2001 remake, 4 7 but the original 1968 movie and progeny-which
illustrate very clearly that it is not sentience, but the ability to speak and
reason that is thought to be the morally significant feature of persons. In
this story, American astronauts travel into earth's future, only to discover
that speaking and intelligent apes now rule, while mute humans are treated
essentially as slaves. The creators of the movie assume, quite safely, that
viewers will find the treatment of the mute humans shocking, but that at the
same time they will be forced to recognize that it is not really different
from current treatment of non-human animals, including apes. The movie,
then, might be thought to raise the question: is the only morally relevant
difference between humans and non-human animals the capacity for speech
and reason? Is that really enough to justify differential treatment?
Let us appreciate for a moment the emotional force of this position.
Imagine if all of a sudden the pigs and cows and chickens on factory farms
began to speak cogently and intelligibly to us: to complain of their
discomfort, to express their aspirations, to query after the fate of their
offspring, and so on. Is it not inconceivable that factory farming could
survive in such circumstances? Recall that in a later episode of Planet of
the Apes, when non-speaking apes have been turned into slaves, the great
fear of their human masters is that the last remaining, speaking ape will
reproduce. The immediate concern of the slave owners is a prudential one,
namely, that a speaking ape could organize effective resistance to ape
slavery. But surely another consideration is at play too. For it is one thing
to treat living creatures as mere slaves and instruments if they can not
articulate in language their reasons, if they are "mere brutes," fit to serve.
But if your ape slave talks and reasons just like you, and if the object of
your carnivorous desire also talks and reasons just like you, then the
situation changes. No one listening to this lecture, I may safely assume,
would gladly consume the person next to him for dinner. But if the creature
to your left or right were a chicken or sheep similarly engaged cognitively
and discursively in my lecture, would you feel differently?

The anti-abortion forces in the United States have always employed a Singerian strategy of
46.
describing the disgusting particulars of abortion to motivate "moral" opposition to it. It strikes me as
curious that philosophers skeptical of the latter fail to notice the similarity to the most successful bits of
rhetoric in support of the rights of non-human animals.
The remake essentially misunderstands the deep moral message of the original 1963 novel by
47.
Pierre Boulle, most centrally by presenting the human slaves as capable of speech.
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To be sure, even the moral significance we now instinctively and
affectively accord to being able to speak and reason is of very recent
vintage, as the history of chattel slavery of humans shows all too clearly.
As the philosopher David Livingstone Smith points out, the treatment of
European slaves was generally akin to the treatment of non-human animals,
like sheep and cattle, and the fact that these slaves could not speak the
language of their master "'made them appear less than fully human"A8 and
thus was crucial to rationalizing their servitude.
Perhaps most remarkable is the story recounted by Smith about Ota
Benga, a nineteenth century African pygmy and resident of the Congo Free
State, who was sold into slavery by the Belgians after his family was
murdered. He was then acquired in the early 1900s by an American zoo
proprietor, who befriended him and then brought him to the United States.
Professor Smith recounts what happened next:
After a brief stint in New York's Museum of Natural History, Ota
Benga was given a home at the newly opened Bronx Zoo [circa
1906], where he soon became an exhibit, sharing a cage with an
orangutan. "Few expressed audible objection to the sight of a
human being in a cage with monkeys as companions," The New
York Times wrote the next day, "and there could be no doubt that to
the majority the joint man-and-monkey exhibition was the most
interesting sight in Bronx Park."49
This no doubt seems utterly shocking to us because a human being was
put in a cage with an ape as an exhibit. It does not shock most of us, I
suspect, in the first instance that an ape was also in a cage for the
amusement of humans. That it is the former, and not the latter, that is so
disturbing is, of course, testament to our deeply engrained moral
speciesism, our continuing sense that the boundaries of the moral
community do stop at the species line.
Should we take comfort in the fact that Kantians can give us a
purportedly principled justification for such a stopping point? After all,
moral standing, for Kantians, turns on rational capacity, on the ability to
respond to reasons and thus to conform one's conduct in accordance with
the demands of practical reason, that is, reasoning about what one ought to
do. Non-human animals can not do that, and so have no real moral standing
at all. Kant's best argument against their mistreatment is that it might
48.
SMITH, supra note 12, at 107 (quoting historian Karl Jacoby). Smith goes on to argue that the
European slave-owners must have realized, at some level, that their slaves simply spoke other
languages, id. at 108, which seems plausible but is probably irrelevant to their ability to rationalize
away the humanity of the slaves.
49.
Id. at 122.
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encourage immoral behavior in rational agents, not that mistreatment of
non-human animals is intrinsically offensive to morality.so But, of course,
Kant's position, like the Benthamite Singer's position, entails morally
shocking conclusions about the moral status of those with severe cognitive
deficiencies, the comatose, and so on.5 ' It will come as no surprise to social
psychologists, but it seems clear that rational reflection does not track very
well our actual, or even imaginable, moral attitudes.
I thus shift back to predictive mode: will the moral, and ultimately
legal, community expand to include non-human animals as full members?
As a colleague of mine quipped,52 if soy or tofu could be made as tasty as
prime rib, then it seems easier to imagine that our negative emotional
response to the suffering of sentient beings would carry the day,
notwithstanding their lack of reason and language, and notwithstanding the
fact that the moral judgment implicit in the prioritization of such sentience
would entail results that strike most of us as morally abhorrent. That tofu
might actually taste good (and thus be integrated into all the cultural and
religious traditions in which food figures) is far more likely, of course, than
that cows and chickens will talk and reason. That this seems relevant to
predicting human attitudes is itself instructive: for it means that sentience
matters practically along many dimensions beyond suffering, that the
multifold pleasures attendant upon our consumption of non-human animals
occupies an important place in our thinking about how to live.
In predicting the evolution of moral attitudes, however, we must also
take into account the "materialist" lesson of much history and
anthropology,53 namely, that moral attitudes are shaped by the economic
and material circumstances in which people find themselves. Advanced
capitalist societies, for example, continue to employ moral notions of
"desert" that, in practice, justify the denial of basic moral consideration
along class lines, though without saying as much: consider the role that
notions of "individual responsibility" and "hard work" continue to play in
moral discourse. Economically undeveloped societies, by contrast, in which
the struggle for daily survival is the basic fact are plainly not societies
which will generally find at all cogent the moral impropriety of eating the
non-human animals that are available for basic sustenance. Because the
Some contemporary Kantians, being fond of non-human animals like cats and dogs, have
50.
tried to resist that conclusion. Their efforts are a bit tortured, and would, I suspect, be unrecognizable to
Kant. An instructive example is the work of Christine Korsgaard. See, e.g., Christine M. Korsgaard,
Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ANIMAL ETHICS 91 (Tom

L. Beauchamp & R.G. Frey eds., 2011).
Kantians often adduce ad hoc considerations to block these conclusions, such as appealing to
51.
potential rationality and so on. These efforts do not really warrant sustained attention.
My thanks to Anup Malani for the quip.
52.
53.
(1974).

See, e.g., MARVIN HARRIS, COWS, PIGS, WARS & WITCHES: THE RIDDLES OF CULTURE
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advanced capitalist societies are ones in which the option of not consuming
non-human animals is, for the first time in human history, a live option for
large numbers of people, it is now possible to treat this question as one of
moral concern. Whigs regard this as a discovery of a morally salient fact,
non-Whigs regard it as an artifact of socio-economic circumstances. My
own, non-Whig prediction is that sentience per se is unlikely to ever
become an overriding moral consideration in wealthy societies (which are
all basically capitalist societies at present) for a variety of reasons, some
causal or explanatory, and some rationalizing or justificatory. First, on the
explanatory side,, the market value of non-human animals is realized
primarily in their availability for consumption in one form or another by
humans, and thus the kind of pressure markets can exert on intra-species
prejudice are largely absent in the inter-species case. Second, and again on
the causal/explanatory side, part of the "improved" standards of living that
capitalist societies deliver everywhere, albeit in fits and starts, includes the
availability of the nutritional and gustatory rewards of consuming nonhuman animals; that these are often tied up with cultural and religious
tradition makes them especially resilient, though such traditions have often
yielded, over time, before the demands of the global market, a fact we
should not forget. Third, and finally, there is a justifying reason-not
simply causal-for thinking that the species boundary is unlikely to be
fully crossed when it comes to basic moral consideration. For the
theoretical reasons, like Bentham's or Singer's, for doing so entail
shocking conclusions-the permissibility of infanticide, for exampleconclusions that reveal the ethical peculiarity of the perspective of thinkers
like Bentham or Singer. There is more to life than the avoidance of
suffering, and there is also more to life than the pursuit of pleasure, but we
can agree that if one were as morally blinkered as Singer is, then eating
hamburger could be worse than infanticide, at least some of the time. All
the world's cultures and literatures reject the Benthamite/Singerian
calculus, and it is a reasonable abductive inference over this vast mountain
of evidence that it reveals something important about human moral
attitudes, including the fact that they appear to be deeply anthropocentric.
And since there is nothing more to ethics than these attitudes, there seems
little reason to expect that the moral community will expand to include
non-human animals as fully equal members.

